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THE PROBLEM OF 
UNITY OF WORLD COMMUNISM 
THE Communist party was conceived by Lenin as a 
highly centralized organization of full-time professional con-
spirators, "no less professionally trained than the police," but 
more militant, completely dedicated to the objectives of the 
Party, as well as highly specialized in a variety of revolutionary 
activities.1 The apex of the Party's organizational structure was 
to consist of a "dozen" tried and talented leaders "working in 
perfect harmony ... " 2 who would "appoint bodies of leaders 
for each town district, for each factory district, and for each 
educational institution." 3 Lenin expected that such a mono-
lithic system would provide solidarity, stability, and continuity 
of leadership, would enjoy the confidence of the masses, and 
would enable him to overthrow Czardom and to seize power. 
He said: 
The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power~ 
[and] a Communist party will be able to perform its duty only 
if it is organized in the most centralized manner, only if iron 
discipline prevails in it, and if its Party center is a powerful and 
authoritative organ, wielding wide powers ... 5 
When the Bolsheviks did seize power, they organized the 
new regime according to the same\.authoritarian and monol~thic 
'V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (New York: 1929), IV, 201. 
2 Ibid., p. 194, 196. 
a / bid., p. 200. 
• Quoted by Joseph Stalin, Foundat.ions of L eninism (New York: 1939), p. 48. 
5 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, X, 204. 
I .. 
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principles which prevailed in the Party. Lenin also stated at 
that time that if Czarist Russia was ruled by 200,000 members 
of the nobility there was no reason why the Soviet Russia could 
not be ruled by 200,000 Bolsheviks. 
In 1919, Lenin conceived an organization of tbe world 
Communist movement along the same principles and with head-
quarters in Moscow. The objective of this organization was the 
establishment of a monolithic Communist dictatorship on a 
world scale. Accordingly, each local Communist patty, in 
order to be a member of the Communist International, had to 
lose its autonomy and submit to the dictates received from the 
headquar1ers in Moscow where the Comintem had constituted 
itself as the "general staff" of the world revolution. Various 
sections of the International (local pa11ies) , themselves mono-
lithically organized, were bound by the strictest discipline, 
forming a world-wide front, directed from one center, in a life 
and death struggle against the non-Communist world. 6 The base 
of this world revolution was the Soviet Union, and the mem-
bers of the Communist Pai1ies, as well as the working class of 
the whole world, were to look at the Soviet Union as their 
only fatherland. The Soviet Union, to whom they owed their 
primary loyalty, was to be defended by these world-wide masses 
against any attack, including attack on the part of one's own 
country.7 
Soviet control of the Communist International found its 
clearest expression in the organization and powers of the Execu-
tive Committee of the International which elected a smaller 
o See Th e Th eses and Statutes of the Communist l nternalional, Second World Con-
gress, July 17-August 7, 1920, Moscow; parLicularly "Conditions of Admis-
sion to the Communist International." See also Program of the Communist 
International, adopted by tl1e Sixth World Congress, September 1st, 1928, 
Moscow, particularly "The Fundamental Tasks of Communist Strategy and 
Tactics." 
, Ibid., parLicularly "The Significance o( U.S.S.R. and Her World Revolutionary 
Duties." 
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body known as the Presidium of the Executive Committee. The 
Presidium in turn elected from among its members the Political 
Committee. And it was the Political Committee ( which was com• 
posed of Moscow-oriented members) that had concentrated in 
its hands all the power of the International.8 In this manner, 
the International Communist movement became a tool in the 
hands of the Kremlin which used the Communist International 
to promote the interests of the Soviet Union. 
Lenin was not without precedent in his image of Moscow 
as the ideological and political headqua11ers of a universal 
state. The ideology of Slavophilism which conceived Moscow as 
the Third Rome, as the center of a universal religion and of a 
world-wide state should not have been alien to him. It was, how• 
ever, Stalin, a Georgian, who for reasons of personal power, 
as well as for reasons of promoting and strengthening a world-
wide Communist movement, that had elaborated a theoretical 
justification of a world Communist monolith of charismatic 
character, centered in Moscow. Stalin stated that the intensity 
of internal contradictions in Czarist Russia, the ability and the 
revolutionary attitude of the Russian people ( said to be "the 
most revolutionary in the world"), gave birth to Leninism, 
which in turn was responsible for the first proletarian revolution 
and for the formation of the "Fatherland of Socialism." Lenin 
thus became the leader not only of the Russian but of the inter• 
national proletariat, according to Stalin.9 
Considering himself as Lenin's rightful successor, Stalin 
unde11ook to Stalinize the Communist parties the world over. 
Stalin had realized that it was the intellectuals in the leader• 
ships of various Communist parties who tended to identify 
8 !bid., "Constitution and Rules of the Cotmnunist International, The Executive 
Committee," points 14, 15, 19, 22, 25. 
0 Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., pp. 10, 15-19. Concerning the 
background of the ideology of a Moscow-centered world-wide state, see D. 
Tomasic, The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism (Glencoe: 
1953). • 
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themselves with the national interests of their own countries 
rnther than with those of the Soviet Union. Hence, in search 
for more compliant leadership, Stalin undertook to substitute 
the intellectuals in Party leadership by people of working class 
oi-igin, without formal education, but outstandjng for their abil-
ity, militancy, discipline, fanatic dedication to the Communist 
cause, and personal loyalty to Stalin. And it was such a thor-
oughly indoctrinated and Moscow-oriented group of leaders in 
the world Communist movement-people who were able to fol-
low Kremlin orders unquestioningly and with deep conviction 
in the rightfulness of Stalin's policies- that were of consider-
able help to the Soviet Union in promoting its global interests 
before and after World War II. The territorial expansion of the 
Soviet Union and the formation of its satellite empire during 
this period would have been inconceivable without such a system 
of monolithism which Stalin had characterized as "complete and 
absolute unity of will and action.mo 
The claim to lead all newly formed Communist states and 
the whole world Communist movement was now justified by the 
Kremlin not only on the basis of Russia's unique revolutionary 
experience, but also on the basis of the Soviet Union's achieve-
ment in expanding proletai-ian revolution, in building Socialism, 
and 1.n developing it toward Communism. The Soviet Union was 
said to be an advanced Socialist country while other Commu-
nist ruled countries- the "People's Democracies"-were said 
to be on a lower stage of Socialist development. 
Before World War II, the monolithic control system cen• 
tered in Moscow was not based only on the rules of the Comin-
tern. At that time Moscow's hold had much deeper roots. 
Moscow's overlordship then was ingrained in the innermost 
feelings and yearnings of hundreds of thousands of idealistic 
and Utopia-seeking Communists the world over, in their quasi-
10 Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, op. cit., pp. 119-20. 
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religious conviction that Russia was fighting for the salvation 
of all downtrodden, all humiliated and oppressed. Such an iden-
tification with Russia fostered endurance of hardships, dedica-
tion to the cause, sufferance of imprisonment and torture, and 
even acceptance of death resignedly. Such a faith in the Father-
land of Socialism strengthened discipline and made many Party 
members ready to accept dictates from Moscow, and its frequent 
shifting of the "Party Line" as well as expulsions and execu-
tions of one's leaders, associates, and close friends; even when 
such an action seemed to be unfair on the basis of known cir-
cumstances.11 
After World War II, however, such emotional ties to 
Moscow began to weaken. The Utopia-seeking Party members 
or sympathizers who had heretofore idealized the Communist 
system from a safe distance were now confronted with Com-
munist reality which had a shocking effect on their feelings and 
attitudes. At the same time the power-oriented fanatics who 
rose to the Party leadership in the course of the Communist 
underground struggle soon realized that their vested interests-
the acquired power and prestige-were not identical with those 
of the KTemlin leaders, particularly when Stalin began to en-
force changes in the leadership of the local Parties and install 
in power those whom he considered to be the safest instruments 
of Moscow (the "Muscovites") . In such a situation the th1·eat-
ened Party leaders (the " homegrown" Communists) were quick 
to appeal to the general public, pointing out that the "national 
interests" of the country were at stake. 
And it was in this dilemma of personal and national versus 
Soviet interests that the Kremlin leaders had lost the most bind-
ing ground of monolithism. It was due to this loss of emotional 
6es and of internationalist orientation that the Red Army had 
11 See, for instance, the official biography of Josi£ Broz Ti1n, as 1old by Ti10 in 
Vladimir Dedier, Tito (New York: 1953), p. 49. 
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to he stationed in the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern 
Eurnpe in order to support the governments headed by Moscow-
appointed and Moscow-dependent Communists.12 
For the same reason wherever the Soviet Union failed to 
maintain large contingents of Soviet armed forces, such as in 
Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, the local Communist leaders 
were enabled to consolidate their power internally as well as 
build a vested interest in their own brand of Communist revolu-
tion which eventually was to come into conflict with Soviet type 
Communism. The question arose lo whom a good Communist 
owes his primary loyalty, to his own Party, its leaders and its 
vested interests, or to the Kremlin, to his own country, or to the 
oviet Union. This dilemma was closely related to the prol,lem 
of who was entitled to define and to interpret the interests of 
the world Communist movement and the sacred texts of Lenin-
ism, the Kremlin, or an assembly of all Communist patties in 
a common consensus based on equal vote. It was such a question 
and conflict of vested interests that struck at the heart of mono-
lithjsm after World War II and brought about open rebellion 
against Moscow in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and more 
recently in China and Albania. 
II 
For an analysis of the problem of conflict and unit in the 
Communist world, the case of Yugoslavia is particularly sig-
njficant. That is, the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations indi-
cates that a rebellion against the Russian type of monolithism 
does not necessarily annul the imperative need for Communist 
unity in regard to the non-Communist world. When the Com-
munist party of Yugoslavia was formed in 1920, it identified 
•~ See on this point D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," The 
Slavic R eview, (October, 1961) ; also by the same author, "The Political 
Leadership in Contemporary Poland," Journal of Hunum Affairs, (Winter, 
1961); and "Direccion y Estructura del Poder en Hungaria," Estudios Sabre 
el Comm.u11ismo, (October-December, 1961), (January-March, 1962) . 
The Problem of Unity of WorlJ Communism 7 
itself completely with the interests of the Soviet Union. It re-
solved that it "will always he ready to fight with all its forces 
for the Russian proletarian revolution and to give everything 
for the defense of that revolution regardless of sacrifices.'"~ 
However, after the Communist party of Yugoslavia had seized 
power and established its contrnl in the country according to 
the Soviet model, it began to develop its own sphere of influence 
and vested interests and these were not always identical with 
those of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, for instance, the Yugoslavs were planning lo expand 
Lheir power in the form of a Belgrade-centered Balkan Federa-
Lion which was to include Bulgaria, Albania, and eventually 
Greece, or at least Greek Macedonia. They put forward claims 
on some parts of southern Austria, as well as on the city of 
Trieste. Tito made trips to other Communist-ruled countries of 
Eastern Europe where he was received with great enthusiasm 
by the local Communists. The Yugoslavs claimed that their ex-
periences in building Communism were better suited for Eastern 
Europe than Russia's model. And the Communist leaders in 
these countries saw in Tito a counterweight to the increasing 
pressures from Moscow. All this was a threat to the heretofore 
unchallenged authority of the Kremlin and it was this conflict 
of Soviet and Yugoslav interests and ambitions that eventually 
brought about the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the community 
of the Communist nations (Cominform) in 1948.1• 
The break with Russia, however, affected adversely the 
situation within the Yugoslav Communist party whose members 
had been trained for years to regard Russia as the center of 
Slav power as well as the source of world Communist inspira-
tion. Demoralization, factionalism, and ideological splits devel-
1 '1 "Program Komunisticke Partije Jugoslavije," lstorijski Arhi11 Kon11mis/Jckr 
Partije Yucoslavije, Belgrade, 1947-1952, Vol. 2, pp. 41. 
14 See on this point D. A. Tomasic, National Communism and Soviet Stratecy 
(Washington, D. C.: 1957) , Chap. VII. • 
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oped within the Party rnnks as well as within the top leadership. 
As a result, Western, anti-Communist influences were beginning 
to infiltrate the country to an extent that caused worries in the 
Party's power:holding circles. Cutting of the umbilical cord to 
the main source of Communist energy and morale not only 
affected adversely the discipline in the Party but gave rise to 
considerable opposition against the Party outside its ranks. 
The Party leadership saw in these events a possible prelude to 
complete disintegration of the Communist system in Yugoslavia 
and to loss of their power ( and lives as well). 1 5 
Faced with such grim possibilities, the Yugoslav ruling 
clique looked for ways to patch up its differences with the 
Kremlin, to return to the fold and even to recognize Russia's 
leadership, at least formally. In the meantime, significant events 
were also taking place in the Soviet Union itself. Stalin was 
dead and in the ensuing struggle for power, Nikita Krushchev 
was in ascendancy, inaugurating a policy of relaxation in the 
rigidity of Kremlin-di1'ected monolithism, as a means to save 
it from its ruins. He stated that there were different "national 
roads" to Communism and that a ce1tain degree of autonomy 
of each Communist country will strengthen rather than weaken 
the cause of world Communism. As a result of such rapproche-
ment in views and change in attitudes, declarations were signed 
in Belgrade (June 1955) and in Moscow (June 1956) in which 
Yugoslavia pledged to follow the Communist line and to sup• 
port the Soviet Union in its international policy. Close economic 
and cultural cooperation between the two countries was decided 
upon and even the prospects of a military agreement were 
indicated. Said Tito, "In peace as in war, Yugoslavia must 
march shoulder-to-shoulder with the Soviet people toward the 
same goal, the goal of the victory of socialism."'0 
1 " lbid., Chaps. Vill and IX. 
11; In a speech in Stalingrad as reported by Radio Moscow, Soviet Home Service, 
June 11, 1956, and in Borba, Belgrade, June 12, 1956. 
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Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia continued to be strained, mainly because of a high-handed 
attitude of the Russians which offended the pride-conscious 
Yugoslavs. Thus, the Declaration of the ruling Communist par• 
ties in Moscow, 1957, was not signed by Yugoslavia. Moreover, 
the Yugoslav Communists, who have often manifested an ambi-
tion to play the role of a "Great Power," were confident that 
they would be able to form a "third force" of " neutral" coun-
tries under Tito's leadership and thus become a leading factor 
in international politics and make an ~istorical contribution of 
their own to the spread of Communism over the globe. Their 
long-range plans of such grandiose proportions included also 
the role of chief mediators between the East and the West dui-ing 
the period of peaceful coexistence.17 For such a role of -world-
wide significance, tbe Yugoslav Communists needed a platform 
which would appeal to the nonaligned, particularly the under-
developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well 
as to Socialist parties and movements in the West. At the same 
time the Yugoslavs wanted to preserve the essential tenets of 
Marxism in order not to risk an irreparable break with Moscow. 
Accordingly, at the Seventh Congress of the League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia which met at Ljubljana in 1958, they 
adopted a Party Program which ·was to serve these ends. 
In underdeveloped countries private native capital tends 
to be rather limited compared to state capital. Therefoi-e the 
state bureaucracy is particularly powerful in these cotmtries 
and is in a key position to effect significant social changes. It 
is to these circles that the Ljubljana Program was intended to 
appeal. Thus the Program states that "state capitalism" was not 
necessarily a "stage" in the capitalist development but could be 
the function of a new type of state: a state which is not any 
17 For a sociological explanation of such political ambitions of Yugoslav Corn• 
monists see D. A. Tomasic. National Communi,sm, and Soviet Strategy 
op. cit., Chaps. IV and VII. • 
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more an exclusive instrument of the bourgeoisie but has ac-
quired an independent role and has placed itself "over and 
above society." The bureaucracy in such a state might become 
an independent social and political factor free from the pres-
sures of the bourgeoisie. In such a situation, state capitalism, 
under certain conditions, might be the first step toward social-
ism.18 This could be achieved in a gradual way, merely by the 
political struggle of "the working class." And in order not to 
alienate the entrenched bureaucracies in these countries, the 
Ljubljana Program purposely minimizes the "leading role" of 
the working class "vanguard"-the Communist party, in the 
transformation of society toward socialism : 
The conception that the Communist parties have a monopoly over 
every aspect of the movement of society toward socialism and 
that socialism can find its representatives only in them and move 
forward through them, is theoretically wrong and practically very 
harmful.10 
At the same time, however, the Program of the Communist 
League of Yugoslavia support~ Khrushchev's ideas of a "par-
liamentary road to Communism" and of "buying off" the revo• 
lution from capitalists. It supports also the present Soviet con-
cept of "peaceful coexistence."20 It is intended to be a link 
between the Communist Internationalism of the Soviet Union 
and local nationalisms of the bureaucracies in the undeFdevel-
oped countries. 
Moreover, as an ideological conflict between Moscow and 
Peking began to take a distinct form, the Yugoslavs saw in this 
situation, too, a good chance for themselves to play a significant 
part on the world stage. Thus, in August, 1960, a series of 
articles appeared in Belgrade's Borba, the leading organ of the 
16 The Program of the Leagne of Comm.uni.sM of Yngoslavia (Ljubljana: 1958), 
Chap. 1. 
1 9 Ibid., Chap. Il. 
20 Ibid., Chaps. II and 111. 
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Yugoslav Communists, in which Russia's position against that of 
China was strongly defended. The a1ticles were written by 
Edward Kardelj, a ranking member of the Politburo ( Executive 
Committee) and official " ideologist" of the Yugoslav party. 
Soon after that, during the meeting of the U.N. General Assem-
bly in New York (1960), Tito and Khrushchev made a public 
declaration concerning the identity of their views on "basic 
issues." How close the two Parties have come to an even closer 
understanding is indicated in the new Program of the Com-
munist party of the Soviet Union (1961) in which Yugoslavia 
is identified as a country that, like the countries which form the 
"Socialist camp," has " likewise taken the Socialist path." ~1 
The ideological rapprochement between Belgrade and 
Moscow might reflect the similarity in the social structures of 
the two countries. Both are ruled by monolithic Communist 
parties, and both are governed by a new, well-paid class of 
privileged bureaucrats and technocrats. This new "technological 
intelligentsia" has developed a vested interest of its own in 
contrast to the rest of the population. And it is this class that has 
been growing in numbers and importance in all the Communist-
ruled countries. This new class, therefore, is developing an 
esprit de corps not only on the local level but on an international 
level as well, identifying its interests with the sw·vival of Com-
munist unity on a world scale. Such a class would therefore 
tend to exert a conceited pressure on their respective Pa1ty 
leaderships to patch up the differences. 
In addition, in the case of Yugoslavia, the internal situa• 
tion is an important factor which works in the direction of a 
pro-Moscow orientation. National rivalries and conflicts in that 
zi Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unio11, adopted at the 22nd Con• 
gress of the Party, Moscow, 1961, Part I, Chap. 3. The Central Committee 
of the Communist party, of Yugoslavia, at its session of Nov. 27, 1961, in 
appreciation for such Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia, bad high praise for 
the 22nd Congress of the Soviet party as having made "a very significant 
con trihution" to the progress of socialism and peace. • 
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country have been intensified in recent years and even affected 
the Communist party's ranks and cadres. The existence of at 
least two rival views in the Party has recently been officially 
recognized: one demanding more centralization, in favor of 
Belgrade, the other more decentralization in favor of national 
republics."~ Moscow, from the point of view of its own interests 
and experiences is inclined to support a monolithic system in 
Yugoslavia centered in Belgrade which would disregard sepa-
rate interests of various nationalities and would tend to 
strengthen Serbian hegemony in the countTy. The Western in-
fluences on the other hand tend to encourage claims of various 
nationalities for self-asse1tion against de-nationalizing and 
hegemonistic monolithism. Thus, the present Serb-dominated 
leadership of the Communist party of Yugoslavia is under in-
tense pressure to come closer to Moscow. And in a recent com-
munique issued in Belgrade jointly by the respective ministers 
of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia they "re-
affirmed the identity or similarity of views on fundamental 
international questions." 23 
III 
The struggle for power which took place in the Soviet 
Union after the death of Stalin and difficulties which developed 
IJetween the Kremlin and the Communist states in Eastern 
Europe opened an opportunity for the Chinese Communist 
leaders to interfere in favor of one or the other Party. Thus, 
it is alleged that in the Soviet-Polish clash, the Chinese inter-
vened in favor of Poland while in the Hungarian Revolution 
they prevailed on the Soviet leaders to crush the uprising by 
armed force. 2• The Chinese Communists have also developed a 
22 See Tito's speech at the session of the Central Committee of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia, November 27, 1961. 
2a United Press International's dispatch from Belgrade, April 21, 1962. 
~• See on this point G. F. Hudson (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Dispu.te (New York: 1961) . 
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great pride in their revolution, which they achieved without 
Russia's help, and in a way which was contrary to the advice 
and directives received from the Kremlin. Hence, considering 
themselves at least equal and possibly even superior to the 
Russians, the Chinese Communist leaders felt free to criticize 
the policies of the Kremlin. They also began to compete with 
the Russians in their propaganda endeavors, and even with 
economic aid, in various parts of the world, particularly Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. 
Conflicts have existed between the two Parties from the 
very beginning of the Chinese Communist movement. As early 
as the late 1920's disagreements arose between Mao Tse-tung 
and Stalin on the question of strategy and tactics of the Com-
munist revolution in China. While Stalin wanted the revolution 
to be centered in the urban proletariat, Mao's tactic was to rely 
on the peasants. At first Mao Tse-tung was demoted but by the 
early 1930's Mao was back in control of the Chinese Communist 
pa1ty.25 He led the Party and the peasant army to victory in the 
late fo1ties without Russia's help and against seemingly insur-
mountable obstacles. 
An important circumstance in the present Sino-Soviet con• 
flict is that the very same people who had led the Chinese 
revolution and had conquered power in China are still ruling 
in China today. And they differ considerably from the Russian 
leaders in terms of background and psychological make-up. The 
Chinese leaders come mostly from middle class families and 
on the whole have had a rather broad education and tend to 
be of an intellectual bent. A large part of Chinese top leaders 
come from the interior provinces of middle China {particularly 
Hunan and Szechuan), from regions which were almost un-
affected by the influences of Western civilization and where 
25 See on this point B. I. Schwartz, Chinese Comm-tmi'.sm and the Rise of Mao 
(Cambridge: 1951). • 
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rebellious, warlike activities and military vocations have been 
a part of the local tradition. 26 As young men these people had 
l'evolted against their elders and against some of the old Chinese 
traditions and-practices in their family and in the community.2; 
But as students in high school and at the university they have 
been indoctrinated in the ideas of the greatness of China's his• 
tory and civilization, which was said to be "older and more 
glorious than that of any other country." They have accepted 
the nationalistic traditions of the Middle Kingdom which had 
expanded over Manchuria1 Turkestan, Mongolia, Korea, For• 
mosa, and Tibet, had penetrated Bu1·ma, Nepal, and Annam, 
and had looked at the rest of Asia as its own sphere of interest. 
Said Mao: 
Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history 
which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures . . . 
The China today has developed from the China in history ; as we 
are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut 
off our whole historical past. We must make a summing-up from 
Confucius down to Sun Yat•sen and inherit this precious legacy. 
This will help us much in directing the great movement of today.~s 
At the same time, however, impressed by the achievements 
of Bolshevik Russia they adopted Marxism-Leninism in its 
Stalinist form, its ideology as well as its practices, as the best 
available psychological and organizational instrument to seize 
power and to expand it. Accordingly, the Chinese leaders be-
came professional revolutionaries and conspirators, fanatically 
dedicated to the seizure of power and fanatically determined to 
z11 According to a personal communication from S. Y. Teng, Professor of Chinese 
History, Indiana University. See also Chao Kuo-chun, "Leadership in the 
Chinese Communist Party," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, (January, 1959), pp. 40-50. 
27 See a sample of biographies of Chinese Communist leaders in Nym Wales, Red 
Dust (Stanford; 1952). 
2s Mao Tse-tung, Selected 117 orks (London; 1954), II, 259-60. See also Shen•yu Dai, 
"Peking's International Position and the Cold War," Annals of the Amer• 
ican Academy of Political and Social Science, op. cit., pp. 112-121. 
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further develop China's greatness. And it was their unshakable 
belief in China's great destiny and in the inevitability of their 
victory that explains, at least partly, their success in overcoming 
seemingly insurmountable difficulties in their road to power. 
The present top Party leadership in the Soviet Union, on 
the other hand, is composed overwhelmingly of leaders of 
Russian nationality who had risen to prominence only after the 
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.29 They are "post-revolution" 
leaders whose education has been geared by the Pa1ty in the 
direction of technical specialization and administrative versa• 
tility rather than broad general knowledge. Thus they have gone 
through a rather specialized polytechnical training which has 
Leen generally below university level. They were picked up 
by the Party for their ability and versatility, for activism and 
sense of dedication from among the young men of working class 
( industrial labor and peasantry) background. "0 Hence, being 
raised and trained as members of a ruling nation and of an 
established class, they tend to be calculating technocrats rather 
than fanatic revolutionaries. 
This difference in the social background, training, and 
psychology of the two leaderships might explain, at least par-
tially, the differences in their "strategy and tactics." Thus, the 
Chinese leaders tend to believe in the inevitability of war with 
the capitalist world and in the necessity of war to spread Com-
munism. They therefore tend to emphasize revolutionary meth-
ods throughout the world regardless of sacrifice in human life 
and suffering and believe in the necessity of constant internal 
tension to spur action and revolutionary enthusiasm in building 
Communism. The Chinese also sponsor the idea that the Soviet 
Union should in the first place help the economic and military 
growth of other Communist-ruled countries, including the devel-
29 Biographies of Soviet Leaders, materials collected by Alan Lichtenstein, Indiana 
University. 
lo Ibid. • 
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opment of nuclear weapons, and thus promote Communist revo-
lution in the rest of the world. 
The Soviet leaders on the other hand tend to focus their 
interest in the first place on "building Communism in the Soviet 
Uuion" under Russian leadership and in expanding Russia's 
power and sphere of interest throughout the world by building 
a strong Soviet industrial base and military machine. Such a 
plan demands a prolonged period of peace, undisturbed by 
wars of international character, at least until such a time when 
the Soviet Union becomes economically and militarily so over-
powering that it can blackmail the rest of the world with the 
threat of war and dictate peace on its own terms. The Russian 
Communists, therefore, say that th.is is the epoch of building 
Socialism and Communism, that the Socialist camp is already 
stronger than the capitalist camp and is therefore able to pre-
vent war and to save humanity from nuclear destruction. Hence 
they stress the possibility of " peaceful transition from capital-
ism to Socialism" and claim that "peaceful coexistence" is the 
" highest form of class struggle.mi The two contrasting leader-
ships and opposite policies were therefore bound to come into 
conflict. 
It appears, m01·eover, that the present Sino-Soviet dispute 
is also a continuation of the age-long rivalry between Holy 
Russia and the Celestial Empire. The Russian Czardom, taking 
advantage of China's weaknesses, has been expanding its power 
and conquests into Asia since early in its history. By the middle 
of the nineteenth century Russia was able to obtain all the 
Chinese territory north of the Amur river as well as the terri-
tory east of the Ussuri River where Russia eventually built the 
port of Vladivostok ( the "Ruler of the East"). By the end of 
the nineteenth century Russia obtained permission to carry the 
a1 See the dooumenls on ideological differences between Moscow and Peking in 
G. F. Hudson (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Disp1tte, op. cit., 
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Trans-Siberian railway directly across Manchuria. Russia also 
extended its influence in Korea, occupied Port Arthur and 
Dairen, as well as a portion of the Liaotung peninsula, and 
claimed all the territory north of the Great Wall. In 1901 
Russia dispatched large bodies of troops into Manchuria. Rus-
sia's further expansion was checked by Japan in the Russo-
Japanese war of 1905 in which the Japanese captured Pott 
Arthur and drove the Russians out of Manchuria and out of 
Sakhalin. 
After the Communist seizme of power in Russia in 1917, 
the Communist rulers did not give up the traditions of Imperial 
Russia, but rather continued in the same footsteps. Thus, basing 
their claims on a secret treaty between Czarist Russia and 
Japan (1907) which empowered the Russian government to 
"lend Mongolia its assistance in order to . . . forbid entry to 
Chinese armies and colonization of her lands by the Chinese." 32 
The Russian Communists considered that Outer Mongolia fell 
within the Soviet sphere of interests. And in order to perpetuate 
its control of that country, the Kremlin incited dissension in it. 
And when violent anti-Russian revolts broke out (1930-32), the 
Red Army quelled them by tanks and planes. Finally a Com-
munist patty securely under a pro-Russian leadership was or• 
ganized and has been used ever since as an instrument of Soviet 
control.33 
On the other hand, the Chinese Communist leaders who 
contrnl Inner Mongolia (inhabited by a numerically larger 
number of Mongols than those in Outer Mongolia) and are 
motivated by the traditional Chinese claims on the whole of 
Asia, have shown a great deal of interest in the fate of their 
!l:! E. B. Price, The Rw;so-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning .Manchur,'.a 
and Mongolia (Baltimore: 1933), p. 107. 
33 William B. Ballis; "Outer Mongolia: Case Study of Soviet Colonialism," Studies 
of the Soviet Union, Vol. l, No. 2, 1%1, Institute for the Study of USSR, 
Munich, Germany. • 
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"racial brothers" across the borders. Thus they have been pro-
moting immigration of Chinese laborers to Outer Mongolia and 
have been helping Outer Mongolia with economic aid. They 
are well aware that Russian overlordship in that country as well 
as in other parts of the Soviet Union has provided a stimulus 
for Pan-Mongolian, Pan-Asian and pro-Chinese attitudes. 
In addition, soon after the death of Stalin, while a struggle 
for power was being fought within the Soviet party, the Chinese 
Communists completed their first five-year plan which laid the 
basis for China's industrialization and for its future as one of 
the leading industrial and military powers in the world. The 
Chinese leadership also had an oppo11unity to assert its inde-
pendence in the field of ideology as well as in the establishment 
of the Commune system in the rural parts of China. The com-
mune was to be an institution which would combine agricultural 
and industrial production, trade, educational activities, and 
military preparedness. It was looked upon as a "great leap 
forward" toward Communism and as a proof that Communism 
in its pure form ( "to each according to his needs from each 
according to his abilities") might be established in China 
sooner than in the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's ideas concerning the Chinese 
pattern of revolution (guerrilla warfare) based in peasantry 
and the Chinese Commune system in the rural areas were looked 
upon by the Chinese Communists as being better suited for un-
derdeveloped peasant countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America than the Soviet pattern of revolution ( through civil 
war or Parliament) and the Soviet agrarian system (Kolkhoz) . 
And it was in the control of these vast areas of the world that 
the answer lay to the question of who is going to assume the 
overlordship of world Communism and of the globe, China or 
Russia. In a speech to the Chinese students at the University of 
Moscow, November 17, 1957, Mao Tse-tung stated the following: 
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The whole world has now a population of 2.7 billion of which the 
various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independ-
ent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries 
now struggling for independence or for complete independence, 
600 million; and the imperialist camp only about 400 million .. . 3' 
According to Mao, there are therefore at present 1.3 billion 
people ( in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) who have not yet 
reached the full capitalist stage of development and are there-
fore open to infiltration and conquests by Communism, par-
ticularly through the instrument of Communist-led "national 
liberation movements" and using Chinese revolutionary experi-
ences. In their written and spoken propaganda the Chinese 
Communists do not seem to leave much doubt that they believe 
these peoples should fall also under the Chinese overlordship. 
Thus, for instance, Chou-En-lai, a close associate of Mao, in a 
speech on August 20, 1958, said the following: 
. . . the peoples of Latin American countries have something in 
common with the peoples of Asian and African countries. They 
have common aims: to oppose colonialism, to oppose imperialist 
aggression and intervention, to demand peace and oppose war, to 
press for independent development of the national economy and 
emergence from backwardness, in other words ... the peoples of 
the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have common 
aspirations and demands.3 5 
Moreover, there are indications that the Chinese Com• 
munists, being the greatest colored nation in the world expect 
to have a special appeal along racial lines among the peoples 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Latin America their 
particular interest seems to be concentrated on Brazil, both 
because that country has a high percentage of people of colored 
and mixed racial traits and because Brazil is potentially the 
most powerful country in Latin America, economically, as well 
s4 NCNA, Peking, November 18, 1957. 
35 SCMP, No. 1836, p. 40, August 20, 1958. See also Shen-yu Dai, "Peking's Inter• 
national Position and the Cold War," op. cit. 1 • 
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as militarily. Including a vast land area and abundant sources of 
raw matei-ials, Brazil has all the potentialities for an autarchic 
economic system as well as for economic and military control 
of other Latin. American counti·ies if led by an aggressive Com-
munist pa11y, under China's guidance. 
IV 
Such aspirations, however, could not fail to arouse concern 
and anxieties in Moscow, heretofore the w1challenged seat of 
Communist world power and of Communist dogma. The com-
munist leaders in the Kremlin could not take lightly Peking's 
plans for expanding their influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, particularly in view of the possibilities of China be-
coming economically and militarily one of the leading world 
powers in the next couple of decades, possessing atomic 
weapons. Moreover the attractive force of Pan-Mongolism and 
Pan-Asiatism in Outer Mongolia and among the Mongoloid and 
Turco-Mongol peoples in Siberia and Soviet Central Asia would 
certainly increase in such circumstances. The Kremlin, there-
fore, could not possibly fail to answer all these threats to its 
leadership in the Communist world, to its territorial gains, and 
to its aspirations to the status as the first and mightiest world 
power. The Kremlin had to act promptly, therefore, to forestall 
the Chinese challenge. The Kremlin's answer came in its new 
Party Program. Thus, in the .first place, the Program empha-
sizes that the Soviet Union is the inspiration and leader of 
mankind and as its past as well as future savior, it states : 
The gigantic revolutionary exploit accomplished by the Soviet 
people roused and inspired the masses in all countries and con-
tinents. A mighty purifying thunderstorm marking the springtime 
of mankind is raging over the earth . . . The Party regards Com-
munist construction in the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet people's greatest 
internationalist task, in keeping with the interests of the inter-
national proletariat and all mankind • . . 
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The Soviet Union saved mankind from Fascist enslavement ... 
As a result of the devoted labor of the Soviet people and the 
theoretical and practical activities of the Communist party of 
the Soviet Union, there exists in the world a Socialist society 
that is a reality and a science of Socialist construction . . . The 
high road to Socialism has been paved. Many peoples are already 
marching along it, and it will he taken sooner or later by all 
peoples.36 
Secondly, the Kremlin in its prog1·am emphasizes the 
necessity of all Communist countries to ally economically, 
politically, and militarily and to form a unified front against 
anti-Communist forces if Socialism is to survive. 
The line of Socialist construction in isolation, detached from the 
world community of Socialist countries, is theoretically untenable 
because it conflicts with the objective laws governing the develop• 
ment of Socialist society. It is harmful economically because it 
causes waste of social labor, retards the rates of growth of pro• 
duction and makes the country dependent upon the capitalist 
world. It is reactionary and dangerous politically because it does 
not uni te, but divides the peoples in face of the united front of 
imperialist forces, because it nourishes bo1irgeois-nationalist ten-
dencies and may ultimately lead to the Toss of the Socialist gains.3 1 
Moreover, in its plan to make "within two decades" the 
Soviet industry "technologically the best and the strongest in 
the world" the Kremlin has conceived a plan according to which 
in the Socialist Community of Nations there should develop a 
system of economy centered in the Soviet Union and based on 
an "international division of labor" and on "technical coopera-
tion ... coordination of economic plans, specialization, and 
combination of production."38 
Such a plan of economic division of labor, regardless of 
its merits in terms of economic efficiency, when centered in a 
monolithic political regime is likely to promote economic and 
36 Program oj the CPSU, op. cit. Part I, Chap. 2. 
a 1 I bid., Part I, Chap. 3. 
38 Ibid. • 
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political dependency. This kind of integration has already been 
in the process of development in the relations between the Soviet 
Union and its European satellites. Communist China, on the 
other hand, planning to develop its own system of economic 
and political integration in the area under its control, has re-
fused to coordinate its economic development with that of Russia 
in order to avoid becoming its economic and political de-
pendency. 
Thirdly, the Soviet leaders leave no doubt that Communism 
will be constructed first of all in the Soviet Union. It will be 
built in other Socialist countries "more or less simultaneously, 
within the same historical epoch." But it will be the Soviet 
Union, "the first country to advance to Communism," that will 
"facilitate and accelerate the advance of the entire world 
Socialist system to Communism.""0 The Program also insists 
that the advance toward Communism could be achieved only 
by degrees; not as the Chinese would like to achieve it by 
skipping stages in its development. 
In addition, according to the Program, particularly great 
attention will be paid to the development of the Asian pa1ts of 
the Soviet Union, a development which will make the Soviet 
Union the greatest Asian power. Says the Program: 
The following must be achieved within the next twenty years: in 
Siberia and Kazakhstan-the creation of large new power bases 
using deposits of cheap coal or the waterpower resources of the 
Angara and Yenisei Rivers; the organization of big centers of 
power-consuming industries and the completion, in Siberia, of 
the country's third metallurgical base; the development of new 
rich ore and coal deposits, and the construction of a number of 
new large machine-building centers; in Central Asia the rapid 
development of ore deposits. The Soviet people will be able to 
carry out daring plans to change the courses of some northern 
so Ibid., Part IT, Chap. 6. 
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rivers and regulate their flow for the purpose of utilizing vast 
quantities of water for the irrigation of arid areas.~0 
Moreover, in addition to exploiting the abundant natural 
resources of these regions, they will also be urbanized and 
Russified. The non-Russian peoples of this area and their 
native cultures are slated for extinction. That industrialization 
of these regions has been already used as an instrument of 
Russification is confirmed in the Program which states that the 
appearance of new industrial centers and the "virgin land" 
project "increased the mobility of the population" so much that 
the boundaries between the constituent republics of the USSR 
are "increasingly losing their former significance." The Pro-
gram also claims that the full-scale Communist construction 
constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations 
in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together, 
until "complete unity is achieved" leading to eventual "efface-
ment of national distinctions, and of language distinctions."41 
That this unity in which national distinctions will be 
effaced will mean assimilation of the people of the USSR by 
the Russians, follows not only from the existing practices, but 
also from the new Party Program which has assigned to the 
Russian language a primary civilizing and unifying role.•2 Ex-
pecting considerable resistance to this plan of Russification on 
the part of nationalities slated for genocide in the Soviet Union, 
as well as on the part of satellite nations scheduled for integra-
tion with the Soviet Union, the Program strongly condemns 
nationalism which is said to be one of the chief obstacles to 
•o 1 bid. , Part 1, a. 
~ 1 Ibid., Part II, Chap. 4, Concerning Lhe policy of Russification of Asiatic parts 
o{ the Soviet Union see Stiulies on. the Soviet Union, op. cit., particularly 
A nth"ny Adamovich, "Soviet Colonialism and the National Republics"; 
llaymirza Hayit, "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonialism"; Andrij 
Bilinsky, "Colonialism or Genocide?"; see also Roman Smal-Stocki, The 
Captive Nations (New York: 1960). 
•2 Ibid., Part Il, Chap. 4. • 
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Socialism and Communism and therefore must be fought ruth-
lessly. When attacking nationalism the Kremlin has also in 
mind the tendency of some countries, such as China and Al-
bania, to develop their own "national" or "racial" brand of 
Communism. Says the Program: 
Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by 
international reaction and the remnants of the domestic reaction-
ary forces against the unity of the socialist countries ... Nation-
alist prejudice and survivals of former national strife are a 
province in which resistance to social progress may be most 
protracted and stubborn, bitter and insidious ... The Marxist-
Leninist internationalist policy and determined efforts to wipe out 
the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism are an 
important condition for further consolidation of the Socialist 
Community.43 
V 
At the 22nd Congress (1961) of the C.P.S.U. the Sino-
Soviet conflict came to the fore in a dispute over Albania. And 
the Albanian question, too, like that of China and Yugoslavia, 
illustrates how the ideological differences between the Com-
munist-ruled states are rooted in the vested interests of various 
Communist regimes, and in the struggle for power among them. 
Albania was not occupied by the Soviet troops at the end 
of World War II. But, since 1941 and up to 1948, Albania's 
Communist party, as well as Albania's governmental, economic, 
and cultural development, were under the guidance of the Com-
munist party of Yugoslavia.44 The currency of the two countries 
was made interchangeable and a customs union was put into 
effect. In all Albanian schools, the study of Serb language was 
made obligatory, and plans were ready for incorporation of 
Albania into Yugoslavia as its seventh republic.•• 
~a Ibid., Part I, Chap. 3. 
"Stavro Skendi, Albania (New York: 1958), pp. 19 ff. 
•• Ibid. 
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This satellite position of Albania in relation to Yugoslavia 
came to an end in 1948 as a result of the break which occurred 
in that year between Moscow and Belgrade. The anti-Yugoslav 
faction in the Albanian Communist party, backed by the Soviet 
Union, rose to power, purged the pro-Tito faction, expelled 
Yugoslav experts, advisors, and representatives and brought in 
Russian agents instead. Thus Albania rnse from its status of a 
dependency of Yugoslavia to that of a satellite of the Soviet 
Union. Albania also became a member of the Soviet bloc's 
Council for Mutual Economic Aid as well as a member of the 
Soviet bloc's Warsaw military treaty in its own right. Such an 
achievement enhanced considerably the anti-Yugoslav faction 
in the Albanian party led by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu; 
they were credited for "liberation of Albania from the yoke of 
Yugoslavia." 
However, regardless of Soviet support, deep distrust of 
Yugoslav Communists and fear of historical Serb aspirations in 
the direction of Albania were not removed from the thoughts 
and feelings of the Albanians. After World War I Yugoslavia 
incorporated a large section of Albania ethnic territory-now 
the autonomous province of Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohia)-where, 
according to Albanian sources, over 850,000 Albanians live, 
while the total population in Albania proper is only about 
1,4,00,000.40 During World War II, the Albanian part of Yugo-
slav territory became an integral part of Albania, but after the 
retreat of Italian and German armies, it was again reincor-
porated into Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav Communists. Since 
1948, the anti-Yugoslav faction of the Albania Communist 
party has taken full advantage of this situation, stirring up 
irredentist aspirations among the Albania people. In this man-
ner, the Albanian party, presenting itself as a champion of 
•6 United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1955, p. 109. According to Rand Mc-
Nally World Atlas, 1961, the population of Albania is 1,562,000. • 
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Albanian nationalism, was able to strengthen its hold over the 
people. 
These feel in gs of threat to national interests and to the 
national independence of Albania were intensified after Yugo-
slavia had concluded with Turkey and Greece the Balkan Pact. 
It was felt that this military collaboration between Yugoslavia 
and Greece might lead toward a renewed pressure on Albania 
on the part of Yugoslavia. Moreover there was the possibility 
that Greece too might demand an autonomous status for the 
Greek minority in southern Albania ( northern Epirus) or to 
claim sovereignty over this part of Albanian territory. In such 
circumstances the Soviet submarine base in Albania was looked 
upon with great favor. The Albanians also saw in the widening 
Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (1948-1955) a ray of hope for eventual 
incorporation of Kosmet into Albania. And on the ideological 
plane Albania became one of the staunchest and most vociferous 
exponents of the Sino-Soviet bloc's concerted attack against 
"Titoism" and "Yugoslav revisionism." 
Not unlike the Yugoslav and the Chinese party leaderships, 
the Albanian party core is still composed of the same people 
who took part in the formation of the Albanian Communist 
party in 1941, in the subsequent guerrilla warfare, and in the 
seizure of power in 1944. From the point of view of religious 
background the leading core of the Albanian party is predomi-
nantly Moslem. It could also be considered predominantly in-
tellectual in terms of Albanian educational standards and 
predominantly of middle class origin in terms of Albania's 
social structure.41 In the latter aspects, as well as in its revolu-
tionary origin, and power-oriented fanaticism, the Albanian 
leadership is similar to the Chinese party leadership. Both have 
imbibed nationalistic attitudes in the course of their schooling 
' 7 See "Biographical Sketches" of Albanian Communist Leaders in Stavro Skendi, 
op. cit., pp. 323-45. 
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and both tend to be orthodox Leninists in the sense that they 
believe that world tension, revolutionary activities, and warfare 
would enhance their internal and external objectives. 
The ethnic origin of Albanian leadership i s almost ex-
clusively Tosk-the ethnic group inhabiting the southern Al-
banian regions. The northern Albanians- the Geg ethnic group 
which is still organized in the form of a tribal system- had 
provided Albanian leadership before the seizure of power by 
the sout11erners. The Gegs therefore tend to resent the dominance 
of the Task people and the imposition of the Tosk dialect as the 
official language of the country .•8 The Geg tribes, however, are 
trnditionally anti-Yugoslav, particularly anti-Serb, since it is 
the Geg Albanians who live across the borders in Yugoslavia 
under the Serb national hegemony. The animosity between the 
two national grnups dates far back into history owing to an 
age-long contest over the same territory. Accordingly, the Al-
banian Communist leaders have used their anti-Yugoslav cam-
paign since 1948 also as an instrument of national unification 
between the No11h and South, and as a means of weakening the 
opposition of the Geg population to Tosk leadership. 
It is therefore understandable that the rapprochement of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1955, as well as the 
"peaceful coexistence" theme put forward at the 20th Congress 
of the CPSU in 1956, were looked upon by the Albanian Com-
munist leaders as ill-omened events. Not only were these hap-
penings considered to be a blow to the national aspirations of 
the Albanians, but they brought back the specter of the Yugoslav 
Communist party once again taking over the reins of Albanian 
political, economic, and cultural life, and purging all anti-
Yugoslavs in the Albanian party. It was at this point, when both 
personal power and national survival were in question, that the 
•s A. R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Ea.stem Europe (Princeton: 
1961), pp. 144-48. 
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Albanian Communists began to look at Communist China as 
their ally and protector. Since Communist China was in the 
meantime organizing within the Communist camp resistance 
against the Soviet leadership and its "revisionism," the switch 
of Albanian allegiance was not only welcomed by the Chinese 
but they also suppo1ted and encouraged the anti-Kremlin stand 
of the Albanians. And when the Kremlin attempted to reverse 
this trend of development with the help of a few pro-Russian 
leaders in the Albanian pa1ty, these were promptly purged hy 
the Hoxha-Shehu pro-Peking faction. 
The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, not wanting to risk 
an open break with China over ideological and other issues, used 
Albania as a "whipping boy" to demonstrate their displeasure 
and their anger concerning the behavior of the Chinese Com-
munists. This was done, as is well known, by Khrushchev in a 
dramatic way at the 22nd Congress of the Communist party in 
the Soviet Union in 1961, when he publicly castigated the Al-
banian leaders for their "dogmatism," "sectarianism," and 
"cult of personality," as a justification for expulsion of Albania 
from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese representative at the Con-
gress, Chou En-lai, however, rose in defense of Albania and 
publicly denounced the way the Russians were treating a "fra-
ternal Communist patty" in contradiction to the 1957 Moscow 
Declaration of Ruling Communist Patties, according to which 
"the Socialist countries base their relations on principles of 
complete equality ... and noninterference in one another's 
affairs," a principle which was stated again in the 1960 Moscow 
statement of 81 Communist patties, as well as in the new Pro-
gram of the CPSU. Thus by defending the Albanians, the 
Chinese Communists emphasized publicly also their own right 
to challenge any one-sided decisions made in the Kremlin on 
the questions which are of direct concern to the rest of the 
Communist world. 
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VI 
It seems clear from the preceding account of events in the 
Sino-Soviet orbit that the struggle for power and conflict of 
vested interests has brought about a certain degree of disinte-
gration of Kremlin-centered monolithism. But will this trend of 
development necessarily lead toward a break in the Sino-Soviet 
alliance and eventually toward open hostilities between two 
Communist worlds, the Western and the Eastern? 
It appears that the Communist global strategy as viewed 
from the Kremlin envisages several zones, centered in the Soviet 
Union and expanding to encompass the whole earth, each one 
of them having a special function to perform in a plan of world 
conquest. Thus the role of the satellite states, immediately ad-
joining the Soviet Union, is to strengthen "the base of world 
revolution" through an economic, cultural, and military inte-
gration with the Soviet Union. This bloc of closely united 
countries would form an impenetrable bastion of Communist 
ideological and material strength. The Communist-ruled coun-
tries which are outside of this inner core, such as Yugoslavia, 
China, and eventually Albania, would form a link between the 
Soviet bloc and that of the "neutral" and underdeveloped coun-
tries ( " national democracies") in which "national liberation 
movements" and "popular front" tactics would be use<l to ease 
the Communist seizure of power, as it has been done earlier in 
Eastern Europe. In some cases this process might be of short 
duration, such as it has happened in Cuba; in others it might 
be rather slow> such as, for instance, in the Arab world. 
In contrast to this view, the CommWlist global strategy, as 
seen from Peking, envisages an emphasis on immediate world-
wide revolutionary activities, led by the Communist-oriented 
groups, primarily in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and 
backed by abundant military aid on the pa.it of all the existing 
Communist-ruled countries particularly the Soviet Union. In • 
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this view a speed-up of a violent seizure of power by means of 
guerrilla warfare or military intervention, is of paramount im-
po1tance before the nascent anti-Communist bourgeoisies en• 
trench themselves and perpetuate their rule. South Vietnam, for 
instance, is a case in point. At the same time the Chinese Com• 
munist leaders, as it was shown earlier, see China and its own 
ring of satellite states as the bastion of Communism and as a 
center of attraction and overlordship for a communized Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. 
Thus looking at the Sino-Soviet relations from the point of 
view of expectations of the leaderships of the two major pa1ties, 
the present cl ispute between them might seem insoluble and 
eventual open hostilities inevitable. Yet in addition to the ruling 
pa1ties, there is another influential and growing class in con• 
temporary Communist societies, as mentioned earlier. This is 
the class of government bureaucrats, technocrats, managers, and 
other experts who possess the know-how and are of paramount 
importance from the point of view of the survival of a complex 
totalitarian system. These technological intelligentsia have to 
be paid handsomely for their indispensable services. They have 
been already accumulating income and privileges, status and 
power. They have also been developing a vested interest of their 
own in the Communist system as well as a class consciousness 
and an esprit de corps on the international Communist level. 
Thus defending its common interests, this " new class" has be-
come a unifying agent among Communist powers, exerting a 
counter-influence on disintegrating trends. 
In addition, the Communist parties and pro-Communist 
groups outside the camp of Communist states, to which the 
growing strength of world Communism is a main source of in-
spiration, of energy, of morale, and of fanatical belief in the 
inevitability of the spread of Communist power over the globe, 
are exerting great pressure in the direction of unity, under-
standing, and common policies among the Communist powers. 
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Since these parties and groups are important to both the Soviet 
Union and China as arms of their foreign policies, their opinions 
and attitudes cannot be entirely neglected. 
Moreover, there is a possibility that a new generation of 
youths will be growing up raised in the Chinese Communes and 
in the Soviet "boarding schools," away from the influences of 
parental homes. Could it be that these young people, devoid of 
human warmth of the family circle and exposed to constant 
drilling of Communist ideologists and coldness of Communist 
barracks, will grow as New Janissaries, fanatic and fierce, and 
eager to spread the Communist faith by sword and nuclear 
bomb against the infidel bourgeoisies of the non-Communist 
world? Or will they destroy themselves in a war of extermina-
tion between rival heresies? 
Thus it should be remembered that while there are con-
flicts of interest between the parties of the Sino-Soviet orbit, they 
also have common aims, and the ideology of inevitability of 
Communist triumph on earth is imperative for the success of all. 
If this is so, then as long as there is "a world to win" 40 there is 
no reason to suppose that all the Communist powers should not 
continue to be united at least under formal Soviet leadership. 
And if they are split into Moscow-centered and Peking-centered 
blocs, they might still divide among themselves the "spheres of 
interests" and form a durable association for global conquest. 
•o Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Chap. IV. • 
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